Inequality in Latin America unambiguously declined in the 2000s. The Gini coefficient fell in 14 of the 17 countries where there is comparable data, and the change was statistically significant for all of them. Existing studies point to two main explanations for the decline in inequality: a reduction in hourly labor income inequality, and more robust and progressive government transfers. Available evidence suggests that it is the skill premium -or, more precisely, the returns to primary, secondary and tertiary education vs. no schooling or incomplete primary schooling-that drives the decline in hourly labor income inequality. The causes behind the decline in returns to schooling, however, have not been unambiguously established. Some studies find that returns fell because of an increase in the supply of workers with more educational attainment; others, because of a shift in demand away from skilled-labor.
Inequality in Latin America Unambiguously Declined in the 2000s
There is substantial evidence suggesting that inequality in Latin America unambiguously declined in the majority of countries in the 2000s. 3 , Nicaragua (1998 Nicaragua ( -2005 , Panama , Paraguay (2001-10) , Peru (2000-10) , Uruguay (2000-10) , and Venezuela . Using the bootstrap method, with a 95 percent significance level, the changes were not found to be statistically significant in Guatemala (represented by a grid bar in the figure) . The periods used for non-Latin American countries are as follows: China (1996 China ( -2005 , India (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , South Africa (1995 -2009 ), and United States (1995 -2007 .
The decline is also significant in terms of orders of magnitude. As shown in Figure   2 , in the eleven countries for which the comparison is possible, the decline in the 2000s was higher than the increase in inequality during the 1990s. The global recession in 2008/09 did not change the downward trend in most countries.
Figure 2: The rise and fall of income inequality

Changes in Gini coefficients, expressed in percentage points
Source: Authors' calculations, based on data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), March 2012. Note: The percentage-point change in the Gini coefficient, before and after inequality started to decline. Although inequality in Ecuador started to decline in 2003, no comparable data were available for earlier years.
Another indication of the quantitative significance of the decline in inequality is its contribution toward reducing poverty. Since 2000, the incidence of extreme poverty (i.e, the percentage of the population earning daily incomes of USD$2.50 in purchasing power parity, PPP, or less) has dropped from 24.9 to 16.3 percent (a reduction of 38 million people) ( Figure 3 ). During the same period, the incidence of total poverty --defined as those earning below USD$4.00 PPP per day --fell from 41.5 to 29.6 percent (a reduction of roughly 49 million people). Applying the Datt-Ravallion decomposition approach (Datt and Ravallion 1992) reveals that, on average, 32 percent of the reduction in poverty is due to the decline in inequality. In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay, the decline in inequality accounted for between 40 and 89 percent of the reduction in poverty ( Figure 4 ). 
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Figure 4: Contribution of the decline in income inequality to changes in poverty
Selected countries; 2000s
Source: Authors' calculations, based on household surveys for the Datt-Ravallion decomposition, and on data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), March 2012, for the changes in the incidence of poverty. Note: The contribution which the decline in inequality made toward reducing poverty was calculated using the standard Datt-Ravallion decomposition methodology (Datt and Ravallion 1992) . The following time periods were used: Argentina (2000 ( -2009 ( ), Bolivia (2000 ( -2008 , Brazil (2001 -2009 ), Chile (2000 -2009 ), Costa Rica (2000 -2009 ), Ecuador (2003 -2009 ), Honduras (1999 -2009 ), Mexico (2000 -2008 , Panama (2001 -2009 ), Peru (2000 -2009 ), and Paraguay (1999 -2009 . Note that the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Uruguay were not included because the residuals were extremely high, indicating unstable results. Including them would have caused a significant upward 'bias' in the estimated contribution attributable to the decline in inequality. * Percentage points of change in the incidence of poverty, as measured by the $2.5 a day international poverty line.
The equalizing role of declining skill premiums and government cash transfers
Disentangling the principal determinants of the decline in inequality in Latin America during the 2000s is not a straightforward task. Interestingly, there is no clear link between the decline in inequality and economic growth. Inequality has declined in countries which Existing studies point to two main explanations for the decline in inequality: a reduction in hourly labor income inequality, and more robust and progressive government transfers (Azevedo et al., 2012; Cornia, 2013; De la Torre et al., 2012; López-Calva and Lustig, 2010; .
Applying a variation of the nonparametric decomposition method developed by Barros et al. (2006) Their main finding is that, for the majority of the fourteen countries included in their study, the most important factor has been relatively strong growth in labor income for workers at the bottom of the income distribution, and in particular, an increase in hourly earnings. On average, 45 percent of the reduction in the Gini coefficient can be attributed to changes in hourly labor income, which has ranged from 22 percent in Panama to 66 percent in Ecuador. In terms of the contributions of non-labor incomes, changes in government transfers contributed, on average, 14 percent of the observed regional decline in inequality, while changes in pensions contributed 7 percent. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across countries (Table 1) 6 . The key question then becomes: What explains the reduction in hourly labor income inequality? In line with the explanations submitted by Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010) and Gasparini and Lustig (2011) , available evidence suggests that it is the skill premium --or, more precisely, the returns to education--that drives the decline in hourly labor income inequality (Azevedo et al., 2013; Barros et al., 2010; Campos et al., 2012; de la Torre et al., 2012; Gasparini and Cruces, 2010) . In particular, during the 2000s, in the majority of the fourteen countries where overall inequality declined, the return to primary, secondary and tertiary education vs. no schooling or incomplete primary schooling declined. In Ecuador, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Chile, the return declined for all levels of education, vis-à-vis no schooling or incomplete primary, while in Costa Rica a decline was reported only for the return to primary education vs. no schooling or incomplete primary.
Results are more mixed for the remaining countries ( Figure 5 ).
Figure 5: Changes in the Gini coefficient and in the return to education; 2000-2010
Annual % change 6 Azevedo et al. (2012) , however, include noncontributory pensions as part of pensions, so their analysis may somewhat underestimate the role of government transfers in explaining the decline in inequality. As shown by Lustig and Pessino (2013) It should be noted that although the distribution of educational attainment has become more equal, this change has had an unequalizing effect (Campos et al.; . What this means is that had the skill premium remained unchanged during this specific period, educational upgrading would have been unequalizing. Because this sounds counter-intuitive, this finding is known as the "paradox of progress." Essentially, it is a by- The determinants of the decline in non-labor income inequality include: returns to capital (interests, profits and rents), private transfers (for example, remittances) and public transfers. The contribution of changes in returns to capital in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, for example, tended to be small and unequalizing ). However, a wellknown fact is that household surveys under-estimate income from capital so the unequalizing effect may have been larger than current estimates indicate. Esquivel et al. (2010) show that, in Mexico, remittances proved to be equalizing and became even more so in the 2000s, because they closed the gap between rural and urban household per capita incomes. Cornia (2013) also shows that the increase in migrant remittances in total household income appears to have had an equalizing effect in El Salvador and Mexico;
however, in Honduras their effect was unequalizing.
As mentioned above, Azevedo et al. (2012) 
The causes of the decline in the returns to education
Existing studies suggest that one of the main factors underlying the decline in income inequality was the decline in the returns to education, often called the skill premium. Why did the returns to education decline? This is where accounts begin to differ. There are four potential (and not mutually exclusive) explanations for this phenomenon: a reduction in the relative demand for skilled workers; an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers; an increase in minimum wages and unionization rates benefiting low-wage workers more than high-wage workers; and a degradation of tertiary education. The latter could occur due to a combination of an expansion of tertiary education of lower quality and/or because those entering expanded tertiary education programs increasingly include individuals with lower abilities, as compared to previous patterns of human capital accumulation.
Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010) posit that the most important factor behind the decline in the returns to education has been an increase in the relative supply of workers with completed secondary and tertiary education, a result of the significant educational upgrading that took place in the region during the 1990s ). This conclusion is also supported by Azevedo et al. (2013) , who suggest that the decline in the skill premium has been driven by an increase in the supply of experienced and educated workers in the region. In Brazil and Mexico, Barros et al. (2010) , and Esquivel et al. (2010) and Campos et al. (2012) , respectively, show that there have been notable changes in the composition of the labor supply, and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers seems to dominate as a factor explaining the decline in the skill premium. In Argentina (Gasparini and Cruces, 2010) , the reduction in the skill premium appears to be related not just to the change in the composition of labor by skills, but also to the employment effects of a booming economy and the wage-compressing effects of active labor market policies implemented by a pro-union government.
The expansion of basic education that underlies the change in labor composition by skill in Brazil and Mexico, in turn, seems to be associated with higher public spending per student in basic education and an increase in education coverage in rural areas. These factors eased supply-side constraints. In addition, the conditional cash transfer programs Bolsa Família (Brazil) and Progresa/Oportunidades (Mexico) reduced demand-side constraints by compensating poor households for schooling costs and for the opportunity cost of children's labor. 7 A summary of these findings can be found in Table 2 . In Brazil, the fall in the skill premium seems to be caused both by changes in the composition of supply and demand as well as institutional factors, such as rising minimum wages. In Peru, it appears to be the result of the combined effect of an increase in the supply of workers with more years of schooling and the fact that demand for skilled workers did not outpace supply. Gasparini and Lustig (2011) ; Argentina, Brazil, Mexico Brazil, Mexico
In both countries, the main driver of the decline in the skill premium was an increase in the relative supply of workers with high levels of education as a result of the educational upgrading that took place during the 1990s.
Gasparini et al. Not all studies find that the decline in the skill premium is the result of an increase in the supply of skilled workers, however. The study by for 16 countries in Latin America during 1989-2009 uses a partial equilibrium framework to study the supply and demand for labor. They assume a production function with an elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor (sigma) for different values 8 and find that, more often than not, demand-side factors dominate supply-side factors in explaining the decline in skill premiums (Table 3) . An attempt to link these results to changing patterns in the composition of output, however, does not yield conclusive results. In an attempt to disentangle the importance of supply and demand factors, estimate a series of wage skill premium regressions. In the absence of an unambiguous indicator for relative demand, the authors use several proxies, including country and year fixed effects (which are assumed to capture the evolution of relative demand); unemployment rates of different skill groups (assumed to affect remuneration gaps between skill groups); an index of minimum wage levels, by country (assumed to capture the potential impact of labor market institutions on the wage skill premium); and an index of "net barter terms of trade" (assumed to capture the effect of international prices in the region on the wage skill premium). Among all of these, only the role of the terms of trade, which captures the effect of the recent boom in commodity prices, seems to support the demand-side hypotheses.
Along these lines, de la Torre et al. (2012) suggest that this boom in commodity prices appears to have played an important role by inducing a significant reallocation of labor from non-commodity tradeable sectors such as manufacturing, to sectors which are less intensive in skilled labor, such as services, which in turn reduced the skill premium and wage inequality. Nonetheless, show that despite the promising role played by the commodity boom, the patterns of employment by sector suggest a significant role for other forces.
For the six case studies included in his analysis, Cornia (2013) suggests that the drivers of the changes in the skill premium depended on the stagnation of demand for and Campos et al. (2012) , for example, reveals that the results are overly sensitive to the age cohorts of workers, the period under study, and, above all, the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, which is very difficult to estimate in a robust manner (see, for example, the discussion by Manacorda et al., 2010) . This is an area in which further research may prove useful, using alternative methods to estimate the elasticity of substitution in order to disentangle the contribution of demand and supply factors more precisely and robustly.
As mentioned above, another factor that could explain the decline in the returns to education is a degradation in the quality of tertiary education. The average (relative) returns to tertiary education could have fallen because, as its coverage expanded, either the quality of the marginal institution or the quality of the marginal student or both were lower.
Yamada and Castro (2012) find evidence that supports the positive relationship between the quality of education and the returns to schooling in Peru. They likewise observed that the "convexification" of the wage profile as a consequence of the low quality of basic education and the better quality of tertiary education, began reversing starting in the 2000s. 9 Depending on the country, the decomposition methods used were those proposed by Lerman and Yitzaki (1985) , Milanovic (1998) , and Bourguignon et al. (2005) . 10 The second step follows a least square dummy variables (LSDV) model to correlate the Gini coefficient with a set of explanatory variables, including indicators of external economic conditions, economic growth; distribution of human capital; taxes and public expenditure; minimum wage; real exchange rate; and democracy.
As documented by the authors, that finding is consistent with the decreasing quality of basic and tertiary education observed during the last ten years, as well as with the lower rate of increase in real wages for skilled workers compared to unskilled workers observed since the 2000s. Preliminary estimates for Mexico, however, do not find such evidence. Using a completely different approach, Urzua et al. (2013) find that a significant proportionbetween 35 and 42 percent, depending on the degree and the institution-of graduates from tertiary education obtain negative net economic returns. These findings, complemented with data for income which show that the gap between the cost and the benefits of tertiary education depend on the quality of tertiary education (World Bank 2011), suggest that the quality of certain types of tertiary education has decreased the skill premium in Chile.
Summing Up
During the 2000s, inequality in Latin America declined in the majority of countries for which a comparison can be made. The decline was statistically significant and significant in terms of the order of magnitude. On average, the decline in inequality accounted for about a third of the decline of the decline in extreme poverty (the remaining two-thirds were accounted for by economic growth).
The two main explanations for the decline in inequality are a reduction in hourly labor income inequality, and higher and more progressive government transfers. The fall in hourly labor income inequality, in turn, is explained by the reduction in the returns to education. Whether the latter is predominantly the result of an increase in the supply of workers with more educational attainment or a decline in the demand of workers with higher skills, has not been unequivocally established.
While not discussed in this paper, some authors have linked the rise of pro-poor government transfers to the process of democratization and Latin America's turn to the left. 11
